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Abstract 
Cheap and available wireless devices are commonly used at our home and in institutions. 
Wireless local area networks (WLAN), new type of networks set us free from problems of 
changing wall socket location. That kind of LANs makes access to the Internet more comfortable. 
We do not have to drill holes in walls and put cables to connect another workstation to the existing 
network. To avoid such problems we can plug the access point install wireless cards and use the 
wireless LAN to connect to the Internet. It is a good idea to go this way, but there are some 
questions associated with that: “Are wireless networks secure?”, “Don’t our data be eavesdropped 
by intruders?”. That article depicts and explains steps that should be taken to build secure wireless 
LAN in different places, home institutions and financial institutions with top-secret data. The 
currently used methods of protecting WLAN from unwanted access are presented here. The article 
presents also some non-standard safeguards. 
 
1. Introduction 
Recently WLAN technologies has found an important place in LAN 
architecture. Low costs of WLAN implementation caused that many people use 
them commonly. Wireless fidelity (Wi-fi) LANs are popular solutions in 
institutions, at schools and finally more and more often at home. Some risks are 
involved with implementation of WLAN solutions and not every user is 
conscious of those weaknesses. One of the most fundamental weaknesses is the 
ability to sniff packets without being discovered. That ability is caused because 
of type of medium that is used to transport packets. Access points propagate 
packets over radio waves and anybody can sniff them. Unsecured and not 
configured WLAN networks are common in cities. Such networks give an easy 
way to read data sent by open WLAN and cause loss of data. Some users can say 
that they do not have any valuable data and possibility of losing them is not a 
problem. Most of such users do not relalize that open networks make a possible 
for intruders to connect. Intruder can use such connection to break into the bank 
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or other institutions. Innocent owner of WLAN can be punished for intruder’s 
action. The second chapter of this paper describes commonly used methods of 
safeguarding WLAN. There are described ways of authorization and 
authentication methods used currently in WLAN. The third section of this article 
shows steps to deploy secure wireless network in different places depending on 
character of deployment place. Additionally, in the third part of paper there are 
proposed easy and non-standard methods of such networks protection. 
 
2. Currently used authorization methods 
There are two layers of OSI model, which give possibility of authentication 
implementation. The second and third layers of OSI model provide such 
possibility. At present there are three ways of implementing authentication in the 
second layer of OSI: 
Open authentication – used in the case of hot spots, where everyone has the 
possibility of connection with the access point. Moreover, anybody is able to 
connect to WLAN. However, only users who pass the second authentication 
system are able to connect to the Internet [1]. 
The shared authentication; a client has got to use the key to acquire the ability 
of using the network. Every user of such network has the same static key that is 
stored on the workstation. The data sent by network configured that way are 
encrypted by WEP protocol. 
WPA – Wi-fi protected access – authentication of clients is done by one of 
the EAP protocol versions. There are a few versions of EAP protocols used 
commonly in WLAN: EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, EAP-LEAP and others. Type of 
used EAP protocol depends on vendor of WLAN device and operating system. 
Advance Encryption Service (AES) or WEP with Temporary Key Integrity 
Protocol (TKIP) encrypts the data sent by the network configured that way. 
WEP – Wired Equivalent Protocol is a wireless security protocol for the 
wireless Local area networks. WEP provides security by encrypting the data that 
are sent through WLAN. Both the Access Point and client use the same key to 
encrypt data. Client is able to connect to the Internet only in the case of using the 
correct key. Encryption of data sent by that method has some vulnerabilities. 
First and most obvious is that intruder can read the key from the network 
settings. In such a case the whole network is unsecured. Another weakness of 
that protocol is algorithm used to encrypt data. WEP uses RC4 algorithm to 
encrypt data. RC4 is a key stream algorithm. Clear data are combined with key 
stream by XOR operation and that way RC4 produces encrypted data. To 
decrypt data we need the same key stream. Combining encrypted data with the 
key stream by XOR operation gives clear data. The problem is that exclusive 
disjunction is symmetrical. When the attacker knows plain and encrypted data he 
can achieve key stream. Intruder can send special broadcast packets and collect 
encrypted data to get the key stream. When he has key stream he can see what is 
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sent over WLAN. WEP has an initial vector (IV) that was added to avoid 
weaknesses of RC4 algorithm. The initial vector was proposed to generate 
different encrypted data from the same plain data. Unfortunately, the initial 
vector is sent as the field in packet so there is no problem to read it. The 
vulnerabilities of WEP protocol mentioned earlier persuade producers to work 
on new protections. Manufacturers added to WEP ability of dynamically 
changing keys. Temporary Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) responsible for 
controlling and automatic key changes was proposed. To raise security WLAN 
devices additionally got the ability to authenticate by EAP protocol. Those two 
changes Wi-fi alliance announced as Wi-fi Protected Area (WPA). Currently we 
have two versions of WPA.  
WPA 1.0 – Wi-fi Protected Access version 1 – Uses dynamically changing 
key protocol – TKIP, to ensure more security of two keys used to encrypt data. 
One for data sending over broadcast and the other for data sending between 
station and gateway. Authentication is done by EAP protocol. Additionally, from 
protect before replay attacks Message integrity check is added to the packet. 
MIC is calculated before the packet is encrypted and put inside the packet before 
it is sent. Access point decrypts packet and rejects packets with bad value of 
MIC. Unfortunately, data are still encrypted by WEP protocol. 
WPA 2.0 – Wi-fi Protected Access version 2 – also uses TKIP to ensure 
dynamically changing keys. That version of WPA specification has MIC to 
protect network from packet injection attack. The second version of WPA has a 
stronger encryption algorithm. It uses Advanced Encryption Service (AES) to 
encrypt and decrypt data. Both AES and RC4 are symmetrical algorithms. That 
algorithm is more complicated and that is why it gives more security to WLAN. 
AES due to its complexity needs faster processors to encrypt data. Old WLAN 
devices cannot use that encryption method because of greater requirements of 
encryption algorithm.  
Both versions of WPA can work in two modes. The first designed for home 
users and the other one for institutions: 
WPA-PSK – that mode is designed for home users who do not have the 
authentication server. It is often named as WPA-Personal [3]. Key used to 
authenticate at Access Point is statically kept on the workstation. That key is 
used in the process of generating Primary Master Key (used to encrypt the data 
sent between workstation and gateway), and Group Master Key (used to encrypt 
the data sent to broadcast). 
WPA-EAP – that mode is designed for institutions. Every user of WLAN has 
its own key. It is often named as WPA-Enterprise [3]. Authentication is made by 
Radius server (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service). Radius stores users 
names and keys. Access Point is Network Access Server (NAS) between the 
authentication server (RADIUS) and the station (STA). That mode resolves a 
problem of one shared key for the whole institution. When one key is stolen only 
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the device using that key is compromised. Other connections use a different key 
and are secure. 
The above mentioned authentication methods used the second layer of 7 layer 
OSI model. As mentioned before there is also ability to authenticate clients over 
the third layer of OSI. Authentication in that layer is based on IP addresses. An 
example of such authentication scheme is Virtual Private Networks. Commonly 
we have several protocols supporting building VPN’s. VPN can be established 
over IPsec protocol or over SSH protocol or SSL protocol. Protocol used to 
build VPN depends on type of software and operating system. 
 
3. Customization 
We can adjust the ways of authentication described in the previous section to 
security level used in our home or institution. Applying a high secure model can 
cause a waste of time and financial sosts. Security level should be adapted to 
value of stored data and dangers that can come into institution or home. Wireless 
devices implement some safeguards that are easy to pass over. We should 
remember that sometimes even the easiest safeguards could stop some intruders. 
We should not omit any of those easy safeguards. Below there are described 
steps to implement secure WLAN in different places. 
 
3.1. Wireless LAN at home 
Home WLAN is made of access point and sets of computers with wireless 
cards connected to the Internet service provider wall socket or modem. The 
example of home network is shown in Figure 1. 
Fig. 1. WLAN network at home 
 
A private user is thrown back on standard safeguards offered by wireless 
devices because of the modest budget allocated to implement WLAN. That is 
why all of the safeguards delivered with wireless device should be turned on 
during implementation of wireless network at home. Below there are described 
standard safeguards that can be turned on during the setup process. First of all 
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the home user should change default network Service Set Identifier (SSID). 
Secondly propagating of network SSID should be turned off. Does anything 
exist if it is not seen? Disabling SSID propagation protects from intruders. That 
protection is easy to pass through by sniffing network and reading SSID from 
packets. That is why the home user should define media access control addresses 
(MAC address) allowing to communicate with the access point. Advanced 
intruders can sniff packets sent by such a network and achieve MAC addresses 
that are allowed to communicate with the access point.  
The home user should also set up WLAN with the support for Wi-fi protected 
access. Older devices, which do not support that mode, can achieve that ability 
by upgrading firmware. It seems to be reasonable to use devices with WPA 1.0 
at home due to high costs of devices equipped with WPA 2.0. Buying devices 
with support of WPA 2.0 is good when the home user builds a new WLAN 
network. Such a user should turn on the data encryption by AES.  
Home users can reduce the range of WLAN by limiting power propagated by 
the access point. Limiting transmit power is a non-standard safeguard. Home 
users quite often omit that safeguard. After limiting power the home user should 
examine a new range of such network and affirm whether radio waves are not 
propagated outside the building. The example of configured WLAN is in  
Figure 2. 
Fig. 2. Secured home WLAN 
 
Limiting time of WLAN device work is another safeguard. The home user 
can use time switcher to achieve that. This is the second non-standard safeguard 
that can raise security of home wireless network. The user can define hours in 
which WLAN will work. For example, during the night between ten p.m. and six 
a.m. the access point can be turned off. Figure 3 shows such a switcher. Another 
kind of switcher is a remote switcher. It can also be used to raise the security 
level. This type of remote switcher enables turning off unplugging the AP 
whenever it is wanted. 
WEP
TKIP
AES
WPA-PSK
WEP
TKIP
AES
WPA-PSK
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Fig. 3. Time switcher and remote switcher 
 
3.2. Wireless LAN in institutions 
Before installing wireless LAN in institutions security policy should be 
created or a section of wireless LAN in existing policy should be added. That 
section should forbid installing any access points and ad-hoc networks in 
institutions without IT staff knowledge. Security policy should fix hours in 
which WLAN devices operate. Type of data encryption used in network should 
be specified. The company security set should describe configuration of access 
points, wireless cards and operating systems. Company department responsible 
for installing and managing WLAN devices should be pointed to [3]. 
Additionally, security policy should fix procedures taken before any WLAN 
hardware is connected to the existing network. For e.g. registering MAC address 
of wireless card, setting up operating system, turning on encryption etc. 
 
3.3. Setting up wireless LAN 
IT department responsible for wireless LAN should have in-depth knowledge 
about all the security settings available in WLAN devices. Wireless LAN should 
not be connected directly to the wired network. All traffic between wireless and 
wired network should come through the firewall. All the safeguards delivered 
with wireless device should be turned on in the process of installing wireless 
network in institutions. The default network SSID should be changed to the 
maximum available length. What is more, the network SSID should not be 
propagated. Default passwords and IP of device should be changed. IP of device 
should use different address scheme and different class of network address. 
Access points should be placed out of reach to prevent from reconfiguring or 
resetting by unauthorized people. 
Authentication by WPA protocol with the Radius server should be 
implemented to achieve the high security level. Using the Radius server gives 
more flexibility and simplicity in managing users’ names and passwords. It also 
helps to manage MAC addresses of trusted wireless cards. It short period of time 
should be fixed for key change in the case of using the first version of WPA 
protocol. 
Additional security can be achieved by setting up monitoring access points. 
That type of access points scans all the radio channels to detect rouge access 
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points set by intruders or frustrated employees. Monitoring the access point can 
also inform about off-hours traffic, unencrypted traffic, ad-hoc networks, and 
improper configuration of access points. 
Example of configured and properly implemented networks is in Figures 4 
and 5. 
FIREWALLRADIUS SERVER
LAN
WPA2-RADIUS
WPA2-RADIUS
WPA2-RADIUS
LAN
LAN
 
Fig. 4. WLAN in institution 
 
(a)                                                             (b) 
Fig. 5. Monitoring WLAN in institutions a) wireless monitor b) wired monitor 
 
Setting up authentication with the Radius server is difficult but in the future it 
will give possibilitz of easy management of wireless users. 
Limiting wireless LAN range can be achieved by directional antennas placed 
in corners of building. That is another kind of non-standard safeguard. Power of 
propagating access points should also be adjusted to the range of those antennas. 
Position of those antennas should be experimentally assigned. A new range of 
wireless network should be examined after the process of placing antennas. 
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When the range of WLAN goes beyond the building, positions of antennas 
should be changed. The example of limiting wireless range is presented in 
Figure 6. 
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Fig. 6. Limiting WLAN range by set a of antennas 
 
3.4. Wireless LAN in organization with top-secret data 
Implementing wireless LAN int such places is not recommended. Institutions 
with top-secret data and financial institutions should avoid using WLAN. Only 
in the case of architectural restrictions in historic buildings wireless networks 
can be used. Implementing such networks in those places need to set up all the 
safeguards mentioned before. Security policy should be created. All the wireless 
device safeguards should be turned on. Additionally, it is recommended to set up 
a virtual private network for the users with wireless workstations. Currently 
VPN gives the higher security level of WLAN. Firewall should allow traffic 
only from VPN-workstation to VPN gateway. The example of such secured 
network is shown in Figure 7. 
INTERNET
PROXY
FIREWALL
VPN Gateway
LAN
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VPN
WPA2
RADIUS
VPN
WPA2
RADIUS
WLAN Gateway
Radius
 
Fig. 7. WLAN in organization with top-secret data 
Pobrane z czasopisma Annales AI- Informatica http://ai.annales.umcs.pl
Data: 04/08/2020 21:59:58
UM
CS
Wireless LAN at home, in institutions and organizations 313
4. Conclusion 
Wireless networks are a very convenient solution. They free us from sets of 
cables. It is a good idea to install wireless LAN in institutions and at home. 
This article points to some additional risks of wireless LAN. It gives some 
ideas of protecting such networks. The article shows safeguards implemented in 
802.11i standard. There are described different types of protection build in it. 
Standard and easy to pass through safeguards are also mentioned. The third 
paragraph has also a few non-standard safeguards connected with limiting 
transmit power. The article describes two different methods of limiting transmit 
power, one by limiting output power of access point. That method is easy and 
available for home users. The second one is that the range of wireless LAN by 
placing different types of antennas. It is obvious that properly configured 
wireless LAN is secure. Currently there is no reason not to trust WLAN security. 
The main purpose of this article is to show different safeguards used at home, 
in institutions and places with too secret data.  
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